

VZCZCXRO8430  
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR  
DE RUEHSM #0118/01 0451701  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 141701Z FEB 08  
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3153  
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 000118

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2018  
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [SW](#) [YI](#)  
SUBJECT: SWEDISH MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR ON KOSOVO

REF: A. STATE 12026

[1](#)B. STATE 13716  
[1](#)C. STATE 14840  
[1](#)D. STATE 14284  
[1](#)E. STOCKHOLM 84

Classified By: DCM Robert Silverman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

#### Summary

[1](#)1. (C) DCM Silverman met February 14 to review Kosovo issues with MFA Political Director Bjorn Lyrvall and urge early recognition. Lyrvall said:

-- Sweden intended to recognize Kosovo, but internal procedures would delay the actual recognition until after a "Privy Council" meeting March 4. In the meantime, Sweden would make a "statement of intention" very shortly after the declaration of independence. It would be as forward-leaning as possible.

-- The EU should have the ESDP Operations Plan approved before the anticipated February 17 Declaration of Independence.

-- The ESDP may not be the right tool for policing northern Kosovo.

-- Sweden shares our view that Kosovo is no precedent for Abkhazia. End Summary.

#### Sweden to State Intent re Kosovo Independence

[1](#)2. (C) DCM met February 14 with MFA Political Director Bjorn Lyrvall to discuss Kosovo policy issues (refs A and B). Lyrvall, who had been in Serbia on February 11, said that with Kosovo's imminent declaration of independence the international community was not entering the end-game stage, but only the end of the beginning stage. Sweden, he said, would not be able to recognize Kosovo's independence immediately after the declaration (ref A). This anticipated recognition was considered to be of such consequence that the King would convene March 4 the rarely convoked Foreign Policy Board that includes all leaders of parliamentary parties plus other dignitaries acting, in Lyrvall's words, as a kind of "Privy Council." However, the Government would issue a general statement of intention regarding Kosovo recognition shortly after the declaration of independence. It would go as far as possible without prejudging the outcome of the Foreign Policy Board consultations. In the end, Lyrvall said, the Government would take the necessary action, whatever the result of the consultations. Lyrvall said Sweden, as the largest EU donor to Kosovo, believed it deserved a place on the Steering Group, and hoped to be invited to the first meeting.

EU Response to Kosovo

13. (C) Lyrvall said the EU had made progress on the ESDP mission to Kosovo, having provisionally agreed February 13 on an Operation Plan that had been place under silence procedure scheduled to end February 15. This would allow the ESDP Mission to be online prior to the expected declaration of independence (DI) on February 17. Within hours of the anticipated DI, EU Political Directors would convene in Brussels February 17 to prepare a statement on Kosovo for the Ministers to approve at the February 18 GAERC. This statement would be a platform document that Lyrvall expected would take note of the DI and call on EU states to respond in accordance with their domestic procedures and international law, but would not include a EU joint recognition of Kosovo. Lyrvall confirmed that EU states holding back on recognizing Kosovo included Cyprus, Romania, and Spain.

14. (C) Sweden was concerned about the reaction of Serbs in northern Kosovo to an ESDP mission. They could view the ESDP as an alien and illegal international presence. The atmosphere would be hostile. How would the ESDP respond if the Serbs in northern Kosovo decided to stage their own municipal elections, or Serb police in northern Kosovo wore Serbian uniforms? The EU needed to address such contingencies, and it was not clear that an ESDP presence in northern Kosovo was the answer. Separately, MFA Global and European Security Director Ambassador Nils Daag told Polcouns February 13 that there were signs that the Serbs were considering allowing an OSCE mission to continue in Kosovo, and that this mission could have a role in addressing sensitivities in northern Kosovo. Daag also confirmed February 14 that Sweden and EU countries would not support Serbia invoking the Berlin Mechanism in OSCE, and this proposal did not appear to have sufficient support in the OSCE to proceed (ref D).

STOCKHOLM 00000118 002 OF 002

15. (C) Lyrvall underscored Sweden's concerns about ensuring a sound legal and administrative basis for the International Steering Group (ISG) and the International Civilian Representative (ICR). A UN link needed to be maintained, and an appropriate division of responsibilities and hand-off from Special Representative of the Secretary General Rickert and UNMIK to the ISG and ICR. The UN Secretary General would also need to be involved.

Abkhazia

-----  
16. (C) DCM also raised ref C concerns regarding possible Russian recognition of Abkhazia. Lyrvall agreed with the U.S. assessment, said it was important to underscore that Kosovo was sui generis, and said he would review our arguments with a view to employing them.  
WOOD